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### The gift of the unknown: Jung(ians) and Freud(ians) at the end of modernity

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## The gift of the unknown: Jung(ians) and Freud(ians) at the end of modernity

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### Abstract

This article is an invited critical response to the essays presented in this special issue on the Unknown. It argues that the Unknown has returned in several fields of knowledge at the end of modernity, representing a typical element in postmodern knowledge. The old and once-rigid dividing line between Jungian and Freudian discourses is being increasingly eroded, as contemporary participants in both traditions discover the Unknown at the core of our theorising and clinical practice.

**Keywords:** *The Unknown, the unconscious, mystery, uncertainty, Freudians, Jungians*

Since Freud, several changes have occurred in psychoanalysis which, I have now come to believe, seem to approach the Jungian concept of the numinous. (James Grotstein, 2006, xii)

### The postmodern condition

What interests me about the articles in this special issue, and about trends in psychoanalytic thought generally is that we are witnessing the return of the Unknown in clinical theory and practice. This reflects broader changes beyond these disciplines, and indeed the Unknown, as ‘mystery’, ‘infinity’ or ‘unknowability’, is returning in numerous areas, including physics, biology, mathematics, psychiatry, neuroscience and ecology. In the arts and humanities, the Unknown as ‘silence’ (Levinas) or ‘the impossible’

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(Derrida) has made an unexpected comeback in such fields as philosophy, sociology and literary theory. What all this shows is that we live in a time of enormous change and instability, where many of the ideas and values of the past have dissolved, and scholars with open minds have to go back to first principles and renegotiate the ground upon which knowledge is based.

In the modern era experts would seek to 'master' fields of knowledge and set about to communicate their specialisations to others. The postmodern era, however, is not so friendly toward hubristic experts and their expertise. The postmodern condition, as defined by Lyotard (1984) and others, is one in which old meta-narratives have collapsed; certainties are overturned and structures torn down. The philosophers who saw this coming, from Nietzsche onward, realised that civilization would have to live amidst the turmoil of collapsing structures and dissolving systems. This would generate high degrees of uncertainty and humanity would have to learn to cope with uncertainty without succumbing to destructive emotional states.

Anxiety and panic is a typical response to uncertainty and we see plenty of it in the community, as well as in those who advocate various forms of fundamentalism. Fundamentalism is an attempt to deny uncertainty by supporting an ideology or formula that is invested with magical properties. Not only does it stave off the Unknown, but it supplies us with a hardened identity formation which protects us from liminality and change. To survive rapid change and the ontological uncertainty that comes with it is a difficult and rare art and one that has to be cultivated in all fields of enquiry. Creative solutions to the problem of living with the Unknown, and finding a relationship with uncertainty, are urgently needed. Here is where psychotherapy can provide frameworks and ideas for the general human situation and not merely for the smaller world of the clinic. For instance, Bion's advocacy of 'negative capability' (1962) and 'tolerance of unknowing' (1970) are key concepts that can alleviate anxiety and tension in contemporary society.

Negative responses to uncertainty seem to grab all the headlines and we hear much less about the creative work that is being done in many fields of enquiry. Scholars at the forefront of knowledge are forced to alleviate collective anxiety and teach us how to live in the new condition. The true 'expert' today is the one who can explain to us, in an informed and 'masterful' way, that the field we thought was so secure, so self-evident and carefully bounded no longer exists – at least, not in the shape it once did. The postmodern expert has to perform as a *psychopomp* who tells his or her audience that the old world has gone but they should not be alarmed. In the manner of a Derrida or a Foucault, the new situation has to be 'welcomed' and students and audiences have to be enjoined to lighten up and not allow the dark clouds of chaos to overwhelm them. Instead of approaching the Unknown with fear and loathing, it has to be welcomed as a source of renewal and spontaneity. A vision of *carnivale* and celebration is needed to combat the more typical reactions of fear, panic and anxiety. To open the doors of knowledge to the Unknown is an important way to accept the challenge of the time and refuse to go into panic mode.

## 2. Religion in a post-religious age

Most unexpected has been the return of 'religion' to areas of knowledge that were believed to be secular, and this shift is found in most of the articles in this issue – it is evident in Main, Schlamm and Eigen. The return of religion has sent many scholars into a state of panic and anxiety (Ward, 1997). Even such fields as Freudian psychoanalysis (Black, 2006) and Derridean philosophy (Caputo, 1997) have not been immune to the general trend. Toward the end of his life, Derrida turned his mind toward religion, in an act that dumbfounded his secular or atheist disciples, and confused the world of thought, since Derrida, from the beginning, seemed to be professing a systematic atheism. Yet he wrote that religion will and must return and that the letters 're' in this word guarantee it will return, renew, revitalise (1998, p. 41). He argued: 'Whatever side one takes in this debate about the 'return of the religious . . . one still must respond. And without waiting. Without waiting too long.' (Derrida, 1998, p. 33)

It was his friend and colleague, Hans Georg Gadamer, who expressed more anxiety and who pointed out that philosophy and thought would not return to religion as it had been in the past. Gadamer said the Unknown was definitely returning and, although this expressed itself in a religious manner, it would not mean that the doctrines of the churches, for instance, would enjoy revival or renewal: 'Clearly "return" cannot mean a return to metaphysics or to any sort of ecclesiastical doctrine', he wrote. Gadamer continued: 'No matter to what extent we recognise the urgency of religion, there can be no return to the doctrines of the church' (1998, p. 207). The *urgency* of religion is a strange note to secular ears, and yet this appears to be one of the imperatives of our time.

What are we returning to with such urgency? We seem to be returning to religion, but not religions. We are returning to the ancient perception that life is lived in the presence of mystery, that the known is grounded in the Unknown (Tacey, 2004). Institutional religion has made the Unknown known and has tried to make mystery doctrinal, fixed and formal. But I can urge my secular colleagues to relax: we are not returning to *that* version of the Unknown, and that is Gadamer's point. He, along with the Derridean school, does not expect to see a revival in Western religions *per se*. If anything, formal religion will continue to decline, just as it did during the secular-modern period. We live in a post-secular world, as John Caputo (2001) has argued, but the postmodern is post-religious as well. The spirit is clearly looking for something new, or, as Nietzsche put it (1872, p. 110), for a mythic life so old that it appears new.

We are looking for a way to live in the presence of mystery that is not fixed or doctrinal. We are hoping for a relationship with the Unknown that is not dependent upon a metaphysics we cannot believe, a religious orthodoxy that has lost credibility or a theology that has been overturned by philosophy and science. We (re)turn to the Unknown without the sturdy 'traditions' that religious institutions believe to be all-important. The spiritual way of the present is postmodern in many aspects, but chief among them is a continued

suspicion of the grand narratives of the past. We continue to rebel against tradition, even as we dare to step into the realm of spirit that tradition believed was its own privileged ground.

### 3. The unknown unknowns

There are many versions of the Unknown and not all the articles in this issue deal with the religious dimension. Julia Cayne and Del Loewenthal raise the pedagogical question: 'If learning about the unknown is considered important in being a psychotherapist, what are the best ways of developing such a practice?' They argue that the experience of the relational is the precise milieu for the kind of learning that makes the therapist alert to the Unknown. This article gathers a fascinating body of quotations, references and ideas that facilitate our appreciation of the Unknown in education and therapy. It was intriguing to discover that classic texts such as those by Laing, Rogers and Bettelheim are still able to illuminate our understanding of psychotherapy and can be re-read with our postmodern concerns in mind. Cayne and Loewenthal argue a case for 'therapeutic knowing', which paradoxically is a form of unknowing, or at least a tolerance of the Unknown in the therapeutic relationship. As we enter more fully into a postmodern condition, this form of knowing – which draws upon intuition, imagination and spontaneity – is to be given primacy over theorising and technique.

Cayne and Loewenthal are advocates of our need to 'address the unknown', 'speak from our unknowing' and 'respond to the ineffable'. One of the anomalies of this concern is that if we repeat the word 'unknown' too often it becomes a part of the inventory of what is known. There is a self-defeating aspect to any enterprise that attempts to befriend, make known, learn from or assimilate the Unknown. In speaking of the Unknown, Cayne and Loewenthal make distinctions between 'the known of the unknown' and 'the unknown of the unknown'. They appear to be deadly serious about this, and it is serious business. However, there is a lighter side, which is avoided or ignored by their studious analysis. I suppose the lighter side was expressed by – and perhaps at the expense of – the beleaguered politician Donald Rumsfeld, who famously proclaimed in his US Department of Defense news briefing on February 12, 2002:

As we know, there are known knowns. There are things we know we know. We also know there are known unknowns. That is to say we know there are some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns, the ones we don't know we don't know.

Rumsfeld goes into history partly as the author of this anomalous saying, which has been joked about, parodied, used as the subject of scorn and even turned into popular songs ('We Don't Know').

But Rumsfeld's part-mesmerising, part-irritating saying has a point. The point is that we have come to 'live with' the Unknown; it is close to us and we are familiar with it. The Unknown is no longer a singular blur in the mind, a vast expanse of infinity that trails off the radar of consciousness. A certain amount of light has crept into the Unknown and, as a result, it has

differentiated and we can perceive a topography of the Unknown. It has split into separate categories of experience and we can make out numerous elements in its nature. Leon Schlamm writes of the 'the known unknown, the relatively unknown, and the *almost* absolutely unknown'. Michael Eigen writes that 'knowing is an essential, implicit part of this unknown, the incommunicado core'. We are so close to the Unknown that some of it is no longer Unknown. This is the 'known unknown', a phrase that is used a lot in these articles.

The idea of the unconscious is a good example. It is employed so often, in numerous discourses within and beyond psychoanalysis, that to some extent it is not 'unconscious' any more. In fact, a good deal of the unconscious is now conscious, so that the very term looks oddly anomalous in serious discourse. We have to keep reminding ourselves that the unconscious is 'really unconscious', which means we do not know what it is, and cannot say much about it. But that does not stop us from trying. Then there are 'the unknown unknowns, the ones we don't know we don't know'. This is what we would have to call the 'deep unconscious', or what Jung calls the 'psychoid'. This level of the unconscious is so unknown that there is hardly any point in talking about it, except we like to know it is 'there' and continue to theorise about it. Eigen writes of this level: 'What I want to emphasize is that the known unknown remains unknown'.

We make fun of Rumsfeld and yet we all end up sounding like him! We die of laughter hearing his words, and yet they contain something that is central to the postmodern experience. We laugh not just at him but at ourselves; we recognise ourselves in his words. His press statement is an anthem of the postmodern world, a riddle or conundrum that gets the spirit of the time right. We are awash in the Unknown and it has an ambivalent effect on us: we are bathed in a sense of mystery and playfully caught up in a world more mysterious than we had realised. Yet we are also battered and confounded by anxiety about what we don't know. It is the Department of Defence that is making this statement, and Rumsfeld is talking about the Iraq war. It is the job of any defence department, as of any psychological defence, to possess positive knowledge or intelligence and not mystery or uncertainty. The object is to gain power over the Unknown by making it known. For Rumsfeld, man of facts and war, the Unknown is the enemy, yet the ubiquity and endurance of the Unknown emerges in the incantatory structure of his words.

#### 4. The synchronicity papers

One aspect of the Unknown in everyday experience concerns strange coincidences, parallelism and acausal connections. These kinds of experiences captivate, entrance and attract a great many today, although Jung argued that in his time rational society placed a strong taboo on this kind of discussion. He said people did 'not to talk about it for fear of exposing themselves to thoughtless ridicule' and added: 'I was amazed to see how carefully the secret was guarded' (1952, p. 816). If this journal issue is any indication, this taboo appears to be lifting and many today are relishing the topic that once appeared

to be out of bounds to rational discourse. It is interesting to see how fear of this aspect of the Unknown has transmuted into fascination and allure.

Nick Totton's *Funny You Should Say that: Paranormality, at the Margins and the Centre of Psychotherapy* is concerned with meaningful coincidences and unexplained connections between events and images in the therapeutic setting. Totton, following Freud, prefers to call these events 'the uncanny' (as in Freud's term *unheimlich*). In his article *Synchronicity and Analysis: Jung and After*, Roderick Main, following Jung, calls the same events 'synchronicities'. Synchronicity is a term that caught on in the wider community and in the new age movement but was largely dismissed by science and knowledge, as it was felt to be bizarre. Totton and Main are discussing basically the same ideas and notions, but one is Freudian and the other Jungian. In keeping with the differences between these traditions, the Freudian approach is more concerned with practical dimensions of the uncanny in the clinical setting, whereas the Jungian study explores a larger and vaster (redundant?) universe, often leaving the clinic behind. Main points out that Jung's concerns about synchronicity were much broader than a concern for individual therapy, and Jung himself did not present his thinking on these experiences in terms of clinical observations. Jung's mind, as ever, is centrifugal, seeking to include more and more aspects of reality, an encompassing quality that many regard as unscientific.

Jung believed that synchronicity told us much about the nature of reality, and his concern with this phenomenon touched on philosophy, religion and the physical sciences. Main argues that Jung's interest in synchronicity 'aims to challenge scientific rationalism, to connect science to the psyche and spirit and so promote a current of re-sacralisation in the modern world'. Jung was not just concerned about spooks, things that go bump in the night or insects on the window, but he argued that reality contains depths and dimensions about which rational enquiry knows nothing. Main argues that the theory of synchronicity seeks to break the sterility of rationalism that blocks the flow of life and the process of individuation. Once the non-rational is accepted in the form of synchronicity, the block is cleared and life can move forward.

It is interesting that the Jungian paper in this issue attempts to redress the balance of the past and introduces more clinical and therapeutic perspectives on the 'cosmic' theme of synchronicity. On the other hand, the Freudian paper is speculative and philosophical and seeks to go beyond clinical examples toward a general theorising about the uncanny. It seems that the Jungians are aware of their deficiencies and trying to ground the cosmic theories in a clinical and practical expression, whereas the Freudians are breaking out of their former limitations and developing a more philosophical approach. Psychoanalytic writers who begin to investigate the mysterious side of life invariably end up sounding like Jungians, and Totton is no exception. All Jungians can say about this is that 'Jung got there first', and he was roundly condemned at the time for what were considered his serious breaches of the scientific method. Now, it seems, the former concerns with scientism are old hat and are considered passé. The things that Jung explored eighty years ago are now in fashion and are even considered central to the psychoanalytic

enterprise. Andrew Samuels was the first major thinker to point this out (1985, p. 9).

A certain amount of injustice seems evident at this stage in history. The post-Freudians are set to explore the Unknown with enthusiasm and gusto and don't appear to have to apologise for doing so, nor do they have to fear reprimand and reprisals from a powerful ruling establishment that might hound them for acting 'irrationally' – as Freudians once did to Jungians. The ground rules seem to have changed and, although Jungians were reviled and scorned for heading off into the Unknown, Freudians such as Bion and Grotstein are applauded for doing so. What fascinates me is that a certain sense of disapproval continues to hover over the reputation of Jungians, even though the Freudians and psychoanalytic thinkers have caught up with Jung's pioneering investigations (Tacey 2006, pp. 7–8). Totton quotes Freud:

The uncanny is in reality nothing new or alien, but something which is familiar and old-established in the mind and which has become alienated from it only through the process of repression. (Freud, 1919, p. 241)

This has an eerie ring to it, if we consider that Jung himself, along with the 'uncanny', had 'become alienated' through 'the process of repression' – a process largely inaugurated by Freud himself! It is odd today that Freud is being constructed as a champion of non-rational processes, when the non-rational was something that Freud set himself against. He tried to destroy the reputation of those whom he judged to be outside the domain of rational thought. Can Freudians have it both ways? Freud as champion of the non-rational and the uncanny *and* Freud as heroic defender of rational science?

Wilfred Bion's mystical reflections and his theorizing about 'O' (for Origin) and 'thoughts without a thinker' seem to owe a good deal to Jung, but this influence is never acknowledged as such. The same could be said of the post-Freudian work of Michael Eigen, James Grotstein and Neville Symington. Everyone now reserves the right to go into 'Jungian' territory but, strangely enough, Jung's personal reputation has not been exonerated in this process. The early mud thrown at him has stuck, and obviously this must be part of the price paid for being too far ahead of the game. The trailblazer shows the way forward and is roundly condemned by those who consider themselves more 'rational'. Then, once the momentum of collective thought catches up with the renegade, others tread his pathway, but the stain of disapproval, a hangover from the earlier period, remains. By 'stain of disapproval' I am not talking about the problem of Jung's alleged anti-Semitism, which is another stain, requiring a different solution. I am talking about the problem of shifting cultural values and assumptions and the time-lag factor that is experienced whenever anyone reaches a new paradigm ahead of the time and thus suffers from *misoneism*, or fear of the new.

It is worth realising that Jung began to take 'meaningful coincidences' for granted toward the end of his life. His view was that wherever psyche was present, especially in its more universal or collective aspect, we should expect to find synchronicities as a matter of course. We are only 'shocked' or 'astonished' by such events to the extent that we remain confined to, and

identified with, a rational worldview based on cause and effect. But as we move into the psyche, which is what takes place in psychotherapy, we ought not be so 'amazed' by the appearance of synchronicity, since the extent of our amazement – or what Totton calls (quoting Eisenbud) 'the disturbing sense of the miraculous' – is directly proportional to our distance from the ground of meaning in which synchronicities occur. In other words, we should stop saying 'Funny you should say that', and begin to accept this as an entirely normal phenomenon within the context of any shared psychic experience. If it is redefined as normal, and our frame of reality adjusted accordingly, then terms such as 'paranormal', 'occult', 'supernatural' and 'extra-sensory' can disappear and are no longer required. By expanding our sense of reality to include such meaningful connections, we no longer find them 'spooky' and no longer have to make arbitrary assertions about the existence of other worlds. The world we already live in, to quote Totton in another context, is 'is already much stranger than we care to admit'.

### 5. The tremendum

If the synchronicity papers emphasise the fascinating aspect of the Unknown, Leon Schlamm's 'C. G. Jung and numinous experience: Between the known and the unknown', reminds us that the Unknown, especially in its religious dimension, is not just a realm which sports strange and uncanny events. For Schlamm, following Jung and Rudolf Otto, the Unknown is above all a paradoxical field, which inspires awe and terror in the human mind. It has its *fascinans* aspect as we find it expressed in synchronicity and the uncanny, but essentially the Unknown is a composite reality, a *mysterium tremendum et fascinans*. It does not just entertain us with its peculiar correspondences between internal and external reality, but it overwhelms us in its *tremendum* aspect and makes us feel impotent and helpless. Schlamm argues a strong case for 'fear and trembling in the face of the awful aspect of the deity'.

It is important to emphasise this darker aspect of the Unknown, because as the Unknown becomes more fashionable and even trendy, we need to be made aware that it is not a funpark to entertain our bored lives, but is a power and locus of energy that can disintegrate us in an instant. Schlamm refers to the 'religious shuddering or horror in the face of the totally weird, the spectral or the uncanny'. Synchronistic phenomena make us feel amazed or alert to the hidden – and often benign – order of the universe, but the *mysterium* has the capacity to blow our minds and destroy our mental health and wellbeing. In this sense, the divine reality is like a juggernaut rather than a benign presence and Schlamm, quoting Jung, points out that divine wrath 'is morally unintelligible, incalculable and arbitrary, rather like stored-up electricity, discharging itself upon any one who comes too near'. This is a sobering reminder to the New-Age movement, whose obsessive preoccupation with dolphins, incense and sunsets blinds it to the destructive and wrathful potential of the divine field.

The Unknown that overlaps our world may appear to us as supportive and positive, helping us with our 'individuation' and our 'journey

toward wholeness'. But the Unknown has its roots in the infinite and eternal and if we get to know it too intimately, we would be plunged into the abyss and disintegrated. It is wise to recall the scriptural sayings that no man can behold the face of the divine and expect to live (Exodus) and that it is 'a terrible thing to fall into the hands of the living God' (Hebrews). These are important corrections not only to New-Age idealism and trendy interest in the uncanny, but also to the 'domestication' of God such as we find in the western religious traditions. The West has been anxious, from the beginning, to deny the wrathful, demonic and dark face of God and to turn God instead into an all-loving and all-benevolent father. Freud's attack on this construct of western culture is legendary, and he exposes it as a product of wishful thinking in *The Future of an Illusion* (1928). The new interest in God and the divine cannot afford to regress to a pre-Freudian and pre-modern stage, where sentimental distortions cloud our image of God and make it impossible to see God's full and terrifying nature.

Not that we can ever see God in its ultimate complexity, since, as Tersteegen reminds us, 'A God comprehended is no God'. All we can know of God is and must remain utterly incomplete and partial. We base our understandings of ultimate reality merely on the glimpses we get from art and culture, religion and spirituality, hunches and intuitions, and experiences of breakdown and breakthrough. These are human glimpses and assumptions about a reality that remains beyond our comprehension. However, Schlamm points out that although our knowledge of God remains incomplete and is always relative, this relativity must not make us despair that our knowledge is pointless and has no value. We need to value our incomplete knowing all the more, as it is all we have in our encounter with the Unknown. The glass, so to speak, is half full and not just half empty. Moreover, the Unknown appears to value our incomplete knowing, as it represents our attempt to move closer to it. It represents, from the other side, the ongoing project of incarnation and embodiment.

This is the more positive and optimistic aspect of the postmodern philosophical stance, a stance that is often lost amid the doom and gloom of prevailing images of postmodernism. The popular imagination completely ignores or omits the positive aspect of the postmodern, reading into it a depressive worldview that is far from evident in the philosophical literature. The philosopher Rene Girard wrote: 'We must admit that truth can coexist with the arbitrary and perhaps even derive from it' (1972: 322). Even Derrida, seemingly the master of nihilism, pointed out that a knowledge burdened with the acute awareness of its own relativity is a knowledge that is still useful and must be supported. We must not be crushed by the realisation of relativity, since we remain in proximate distance to the Absolute, even if it cannot be brought into the realm of discourse. Schlamm writes of 'a humbling acknowledgement of the relativism of all knowledge and experience' and it is true that relativity should humble us but not make us humiliated. It only humiliates a cultural or religious stance that imagines it has some kind of absolute hold on truth. We are humiliated if we are arrogant in our knowing,

but if we sit loosely with our knowing, and recognise its limitations, this kind of humility can and does bring us closer to truth.

## 6. The blurring of old distinctions

Michael Eigen argues that ‘knowing is an essential, implicit part’ of psychotherapy. And yet therapy is a ‘knowing in which the unknown remains unknown’. This is markedly different from the old ideals of psychoanalysis, in which the aim was to make the unconscious conscious. Freud compared analysis to draining the watery seas, with a view to winning dry land to add to the existing territory of the conscious ego. In his *New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis* Freud proclaimed: ‘Where *id* was, there *ego* shall be’, and he described the intention of psychoanalysis as:

To strengthen the ego, to make it more independent of the super-ego, to widen its field of perception and enlarge its organization, so that it can appropriate fresh portions of the *id*... it is a work of culture not unlike the draining of the Zuider Zee. (1932, p. 5)

Post-Freudians seem to have given up, renounced this heroic fantasy. Today they find more interest in maintaining the otherness of the unconscious and respecting it as such. This is essentially a religious attitude, an attitude of attending to mystery and living in the presence of the Other.

Far from draining the unconscious, Michael Eigen imagines therapy as a process by which we deepen our appreciation of its depths. He writes that in therapy ‘the unknown deepens, grows richer’. The *work of culture* that Freud wrote about in 1932 now operates in reverse – no longer is the focus on enlarging the ego but, rather, on relativising the ego and deepening the Unknown. Eigen expands on his notion of therapy:

The unknown gives birth to a fuller unknown, is part of the ever growing unknown, an unknown that is the background, horizon, support of experience.

Is this still a science? Is this concerned with empirical proof and scientific method? No, it is pure religion – but it is the best kind of religion, the kind arrived at through the agency of intuition and experience. It is a religious attitude based not on dogmas or creeds, but on a surrender of the ego’s will to something larger and greater, something that enfolds, supports and holds it in a primal embrace. It is existential religion, not theological or abstract faith.

What Eigen advocates is, of course, pure Jung. But it is a Jungian stance without Jung, or it arrives at the spirit of Jung without needing Jung as guide. Again, it confirms my hunch that the ‘problem’ with Jung is that he got to his position too early and the world was not ready for it. Now, therapists from all schools of thought – regardless of lineage or affiliation – are seeking to cultivate and deepen the Unknown, to preserve its integrity, discern its purpose, sanctify it to some extent and protect it from the ravages of the ego. The post-Freudians don’t seem to need the weight of Jungian terms and structures; they can do without the collective unconscious and the archetypes, the Self and the transcendent function. They are moving in the same territory,

but travelling lighter, without the burden of neologisms and scientific-appearing apparatus.

Jung laboured under the same fantasy of science as Freud, but he often stepped outside that fantasy, and was condemned because of it. Now, the post-Freudians move into religious territory, without attempting to appear 'scientific' in the Freudian or Jungian sense. There has been a paradigm shift, a postmodern turn, a change of heart and mind that has been in the making since Winnicott and especially Bion. Jung's assertion that there is a collective unconscious beneath and below the personal unconscious, is no more unlikely or ridiculous than Bion's assertion of a domain of psyche he called 'O', for Origin (1965). Jung's archetypes, which exist beneath the complexes, are no more implausible than Bion's 'invariants', which are theoretical notions between 'O' and our attempts to represent it. Bion believed in the idea of 'thoughts without a thinker', which, again, is identical to Jung's archetypes and to his idea that intuition perceives subliminal thoughts in the unconscious mind. A sense of mystery and possibility pervades Bion's work, which is identical to Jung's concept of the numinous, a mystical aura around all archetypal contents.

Jung's reaching for the deeper dimensions of mind took him outside science and into art and religion, thus revealing a poetic or mythic basis of consciousness. As he crossed over into a different world, philosophy replaced science and intuitive speculation replaced empirical methods. But now the post-Freudians are being urged into the same direction, thus suggesting that the deeper reaches of mental functioning resist the methods of science and invite the methods of myth. We see the same process occurring in theoretical physics, where the deeper the physicists move toward the analysis of matter, the more their theories appear mystical rather than scientific, religious rather than empirical. It would seem that reality rests upon a vast oceanic substrate that resists rational knowing and is best apprehended as mysterious and numinous. There is a point at which *logos* gives way to *mythos*.

It is clear that Michael Eigen (1998, 2006) is at the epicentre of this historic moment in which Freudian and Jungian positions merge and regain the unity of purpose and commitment that was lost a hundred years ago. In this regard, he is part of a number of creative religious thinkers in the post-Freudian camp, which would include David Black (2006), Neville Symington (1994), James Grotstein (2000), William Meissner (1984), Ana-Maria Rizzuto (1979) and James Jones (1991). I am happy to award the status of 'honorary Jungians' to each of these writers and analysts, but I am not sure if they would appreciate it! After all, the Jungian stain persists into the present, even though these analysts and scholars have gone far into 'Jungian' territory. The *rapprochement* between analytical psychology and psychoanalysis that I envisage is theoretical only, and not a practical arrangement where scholars reach across the divide and accept each other as fellows and friends. But what has brought these rival traditions together is mutual regard for the Unknown, which has insinuated itself again and has given us the gift of itself, to scholarship and therapy alike.

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